

DISPATCH

SECRET

EUCA 62- 970

TO : Chief of Base, Salzburg (ATTN [ ]  
 Chief, KUCLUB; Chief, EE  
 Chief of Station, Vienna  
 Chief, NATCA

FROM : Chief, EUCA *ZAC*

14 SEPTEMBER 1962

SUBJECT: Operational/GRCROOND  
 GRICE-1 Communications Training Report

RE "404" - (CHECK "1" ONE)

EXEMPTED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INDEXING CAN BE SUSPENDED  
BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

1. The GRCROOND training program for 1962 calls for several of the GRCROOND agents to participate during the summer in Unconventional Warfare and Guerilla Warfare training conducted by the 10th Special Forces in the vicinity of Bad Toelz, Germany. Because GRICE-1 was selected by the GRCROOND Case Officer, [ ] to participate in this training, his annual communications refresher training period was materially shortened. The undersigned Training Officer met [ ] and GRICE-1 at approximately 0930 hours on 23 July and communications training was conducted on 23 and 24 July in a Munich safe-apartment. [ ] and GRICE-1 departed Munich the morning of 25 July for Bad Toelz where the U/W training was held from 25-28 July 1962.

2. Since GRICE-1's last communications training was held in May 1961, a review of all of his assigned operational systems and procedures was given at this session. The review covered the following subjects: the BYCINE/U Signal Plan, the BYLDEX UTFT Indicator System, Activation Instructions, ZIDOFF Broadcast Procedures and Format, ZIGARE Frequency Change System, EDACEL Extra Schedule System, GRCOPI, the 50-2 Calling Clock, the ZIBALT/11 Primary Cryptographic System and the security check used in conjunction therewith.

3. During the course of this training session, GRICE-1's emergency cryptographic system, KOURTE/11, was canceled. In its place, a package of four reduced-size, literal-text pads was issued to [ ] for carrying across the border and subsequent issue to GRICE-1. These are to be separately cached for use in the event of compromise or non-availability of his primary cryptographic cache. Included in the package were two Reg. #1 encipher pads (FR-545, pad activating group SEZJG and FR-546, pad activating group SCCEK) and two Reg. #2 decipher pads (FR-529, pad activating group JHXIO and FR-530, pad activating group EPQGN).

4. After being given a review of the BYLDEX UTFT indicator system and deciphering a practice UTFT message, GRICE-1 copied a broadcast made by the LIMBER Base station using ZIDOFF broadcast procedures and format. The received message was deciphered by GRICE-1 and provided him with the UTFT indicators required to put the contact portion of the training signal plan, RIZIK, into operation. This plan was used during the balance of the training period. Several reduced distance contacts were held between the Agent and the Training Officer working in different rooms of the safehouse and using RS-6 sets tuned on dummy loads. A two-way contact scheduled with LIMBER Base station for the afternoon of 24 July from the safehouse was unsuccessful due to an unintentional oversight by the Base station. A message was enciphered by GRICE-1 in the ZIBALT/11 cryptographic system for one of his practice contacts to insure that he understood both the system and the proper use of his security check.

5. In conformance with a request by [ ] two-way contact schedules with LIMBER were arranged for each evening of the period

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FORM 804  
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 (40)

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